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CHAPTER 1 0
The High Cost of the Iraq War
Joseph E. Stiglitz
THE MOST IMPORTANT things in life, and life itself, are priceless. But 
that does not mean that issues involving the preservation of life (or a 
way of life), such as defense, should escape cool, hard economic anal-
ysis. They should not.
Shortly before the current Iraq war, when Bush administration 
economist Larry Lindsey suggested that the costs might range be-
tween $100 billion and $200 billion, other offi cials quickly demurred. 
For example, Offi ce of Management and Bud get Director Mitch 
Daniels put the number at $60 billion. It is now clear that Lindsey’s 
numbers  were a gross underestimate (Bumiller 2002).
Concerned that the Bush administration might be misleading ev-
eryone about the Iraq war’s costs, just as it had about Iraq’s weapons of 
mass destruction and connection with  al- Qaida, I teamed up with 
Linda Bilmes, a bud get expert at Harvard, to examine the issue. Even 
as opponents of the war, we  were staggered by what we found. Our 
estimates range from slightly less than a trillion dollars (our conserva-
tive estimate) to more than $2 trillion (our moderate estimate). These 
and all subsequent fi gures can be found in Stiglitz and Bilmes (2006).
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HOW THE COSTS ADD UP
Our analysis starts with the $500 billion that the Congressional 
Bud get Offi ce (CBO) openly talks about, which is already ten times 
higher than what the administration said the war would cost. This 
estimate, though, falls far short of the full costs of the war because 
the reported numbers do not even include the full bud getary costs to 
the government, which are but a fraction of the costs to the economy 
as a  whole.
For example, the Bush administration has been doing everything 
it can to hide the huge number of returning veterans who are severely 
 wounded—over 12,000 so far, including roughly 20 percent with se-
rious brain and head injuries. So it is no surprise that the CBO’s fi g-
ure of $500 billion ignores the lifetime disability and  health- care costs 
that the government will have to pay for years to come.
Nor does the administration want to face up to the military’s re-
cruiting and retention problems. The result is large reenlistment bo-
nuses, improved benefi ts, and higher recruiting  costs—up 20 percent 
just from 2003 to 2005. Moreover, the war causes extreme wear on 
equipment, some of which will have to be replaced.
These bud getary costs (exclusive of interest) amount to $652 bil-
lion in our conservative estimate and $799 billion in our moderate 
estimate. Arguably, since the government has not reined in other ex-
penditures or increased taxes, the expenditures have been debt fi -
nanced, and the interest costs on this debt add another $98 billion 
(conservative) to $385 billion (moderate) to the bud getary costs.
Of course, the brunt of the costs of injury and death is borne by 
soldiers and their families. But the military pays disability benefi ts 
that are markedly lower than the value of lost earnings. Similarly, 
payments for those who are killed amount to only $500,000, which 
is far less than standard estimates of the lifetime economic cost of a 
death, sometimes referred to as the statistical value of a life ($6.1 mil-
lion to $6.5 million).
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But the costs don’t stop there. The Bush administration once 
claimed that the Iraq war would be good for the economy, with one 
spokesperson even suggesting that it was the best way to ensure low 
oil prices. As in so many other ways, things have turned out differ-
ently: the oil companies are the big winners, while the American and 
global economies are losers. Being extremely conservative, we esti-
mate the overall effect on the economy if only $5 or $10 of the in-
crease in the price of oil per barrel is attributed to the war. Combined 
with assumptions about the length of price increases, assumed to be 
between fi ve and ten years, this implies a cost to the American econ-
omy of $125–300 billion.
At the same time, money spent on the war could have been spent 
elsewhere. We estimate that if a portion of that money had been allo-
cated to domestic investment in roads, schools, and research, the 
American economy would have been stimulated more in the short 
run, and its growth would have been enhanced in the long run.
There are a number of other costs, some potentially quite large, 
although quantifying them is problematic. For instance, Americans 
pay some $300 billion annually for the “option value” of military 
 preparedness—being able to fi ght wherever needed. That Americans 
are willing to pay this suggests that the option value exceeds the 
costs. But there is little doubt that the option value has been greatly 
impaired and will likely remain so for several years.
In short, even our moderate estimate may signifi cantly underesti-
mate the cost of America’s involvement in Iraq. And our estimate 
does not include any of the costs implied by the enormous loss of life 
and property in Iraq itself.
THE IMPLICATIONS
We do not attempt to explain whether the American people  were 
deliberately misled regarding the war’s costs or whether the Bush 
Economics of the Iraq War
The High Cost of the Iraq War 83
administration’s gross underestimate should be attributed to in-
competence, as it vehemently argues is true in the case of weapons 
of mass destruction.
Nor do we attempt to assess whether there  were more  cost-
 effective ways of waging the war. Recent evidence that deaths and in-
juries would have been greatly reduced had better body armor been 
provided to troops suggests how  short- run frugality can lead to  long-
 run costs. Certainly, when a war’s timing is a matter of choice, as in 
this case, inadequate preparation is even less justifi able.
But such considerations appear to be beyond the Bush adminis-
tration’s reckoning. Elaborate  cost- benefi t analyses of major projects 
have been standard practice in the Department of Defense and else-
where in government for almost a  half- century. During the planning 
stages, the Iraq war was expected to be an im mense “project,” yet it 
now appears that the initial analysis of its benefi ts was greatly fl awed 
and that of its costs virtually absent.
One cannot help but wonder:  were there alternative ways of spend-
ing a fraction of the war’s $1–2 trillion in costs that would have better 
strengthened security, boosted prosperity, and promoted democracy?
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